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The Constitution and "Liberated"
Community Property in California --
Some Constitutional Issues and Problems
Under the Newly Enacted Dymally Bill
By JACK F. BONANNO*
Introduction
On October 1, 1973, the governor of the state of California
signed into law, effective January 1, 1975, a legislative enactment1
that substantially revises, inter alia, numerous provisions of California
law (principally the Civil Code), covering certain relationships be-
tween spouses with respect to their community property.2  Frequently
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
Law. The author wishes to acknowledge the capable research and editorial assistance
of Edith Rae Matthai of the Quarterly editorial staff.
1. Cal. Stats. 1973, ch. 987, § 20 of the law provides:
Except as provided in Section 21, the provisions of this act shall be operative Jan-
uary 1, 1975.
Section 21 deals only with amendments to § 5116 of CAL. CIv. CODE (West 1970)
under Assembly Bill 312 covering the liability of community property for debts con-
tracted by the wife prior to Jan. 1, 1975, and the garnishment of a spouse's wages
to pay for debts incurred by the other spouse after Jan. 1, 1975. Although the prevail-
ing version of CAL. CIv. CODE § 5116 (West 1970) came from Assembly Bill 312,
both bills reflect the legislative purpose that all community property will become fully
liable only for debts contracted by either spouse after Jan. 1, 1975. Prior to that date,
only property managed and controlled by the debtor spouse would generally be liable,
although an exception is made in § 5116(b) to permit recovery by the wife's creditor
against her earnings or separate property which have been commingled with other com-
munity property.
2. Amended by the new law are CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5102, 5105, 5110, 5113.5,
5116, 5117, 5120, 5121, 5122, 5123, 5125, 5127, 5131, and 5132 (West 1970). The
new law repeals former § 5101, providing that the husband was the head of the family
with the power to choose any reasonable place or mode of living, and § 5124, allowing
the wife to manage and control only community property stemming from earnings or
personal injury damages acquired during marriage. The new law also adds CAL. CIV.
CODE § 199, which limits the source of support of a child of a prior marriage to the
earnings and separate property of the natural parent of said child. Also amended is
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called the Dymally Bill after its principal author and supporter,
State Senator Mervyn Dymally, an advocate of women's rights, this
new law makes a fundamental change in the California community
property system by giving to both spouses joint and several manage-
ment and control' of the community property after January 1, 1975.4
Although some changes are expected to be made by a "trailer bill"
that will be introduced in the current session of the legislature, 5 the
principle of joint and several management and control of the com-
munity property is likely to remain, with perhaps some modifications,
and to go into effect on January 1, 1975.6
If the new form of management and control were to affect only
property rights acquired after January 1, 1975, there would need to be
concern only about the pragmatic question of whether joint and sev-
eral management and control of the community property is more
workable than the present system. Certainly, the legal, non-constitu-
tional ramifications of such joint management and control are many
and farreaching in their application and are worthy of extended dis-
§ 173000 of the CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE (West 1968) dealing with con-
tributions of children, spouses and parents toward support of persons otherwise eligible
for welfare aid.
3. As used in this article, "joint and several" management and control means
that either spouse alone or both spouses jointly may exercise management and control
over all of the community property. "Joint" management and control means that the
spouses must act cooperatively or jointly as to the particular transaction involving man-
agement and control of the community property. One example of joint management
and control of community property is contained in CAL. CIv. CODE § 5127 (West
1970), which required both spouses to join in executing any instrument by which com-
munity real property or any interest therein is leased for a period longer than one year,
or is sold, conveyed, or encumbered. "Equal" management and control as used in this
article means that each spouse would manage his or her half of the community prop-
erty or would manage and control that community property which he or she was re-
sponsible for acquiring. Other articles have referred to equal management and control
as a system in which each spouse acting alone can fully bind, dispose of, and control
the entire community property. Note, Equal Rights and Equal Protection: Who Has
Management and Control?, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 892, 909 (1973).
4. Section 5125(b) under the Dymally Bill provides for the following exception
to the rule of joint and several management and control: "A spouse who is operating
or managing a business or an interest in a business which is community personal prop-
erty has the sole management and control of the business or interest."
5. S.B. 1601 has been introduced in the current session of the California Legis-
lature as a "spot bill" which will be left open for the insertion of the various provi-
sions which will make up the "trailer bill" to amend the new law.
6. The author has been advised by Bion Gregory, Esq., the Chief Counsel for
the California Senate Committee on Judiciary, that the "trailer bill" will merely carry
technical amendments to the new law rather than provisions covering new subject mat-
ter or policies. The most important technical amendment will determine whether the
provisions of the new law will apply retroactively.
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cussion in other law review articles.1  However, because the
Dymally Bill generally makes no differentiation, for purposes of
joint and several management and control, between community prop-
erty acquired before January 1, 1975, and community property ac-
quired on or after that date, a very serious constitutional question is
raised as to the propriety of applying the new law to community
property acquired before 1975 and thus previously subject to a differ-
ent form of management and control. The constitutional question
arises since the right of management and control is one of the
"bundle of rights" that comprise the totality of what is called
"property", or, in this case, "community property."8
As a property right, a person's pre-existing right to manage and
control vested property interests may not be altered or taken away with-
out due process of law;9 California cases have applied this constitutional
requirement to preserve community property interests acquired prior
to a change in the law affecting the nature and extent of the relative
rights of the spouses in community property.10 Were the constitutional
issues limited to the question of due process, the fate of the new law
when first tested in the courts would seem fairly certain, but because
other existing and proposed constitutional provisions could be applicable
(as will be discussed), the constitutional issues promise to be con-
siderably more complex.
Apart from the likely difficulties and litigation that will arise
7. For example, under the Dymally Bill effective Jan. 1, 1975, CAL. Civ. CODE §
5125 (West 1970) will provide in part: "Except as provided in subdivisions (b) and
(c) and Sections 5113.5 and 5128, either spouse has the management and control of
the community personal property, with like absolute power of disposition, other than
testamentary, as the spouse has of the separate estate of the spouse; provided, however,
that the spouse cannot make a gift of such community personal property, or dispose
of the same without a valuable consideration, or sell, convey, or encumber the furniture,
furnishings, or fittings of the home, or the clothing or wearing apparel of the other
spouse or minor children that is community, without the written consent of the other
spouse."
8. See People v. Walker, 33 Cal. App. 2d 18, 20, 90 P.2d 854, 855 (1939).
9. The case of Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal. 601, 612, 218 P. 22, 30 (1923),
for example, held that to deprive a husband of the sole right of alienation after acquisi-
tion "would deprive him of a vested right," citing Spreckles v. Spreckles, 116 Cal. 339,
43 P. 228 (1897), which recognized a husband's power to make a gift of community
property without the wife's consent as a property right.
10. Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 623, 145 P.2d 312, 322 (1944); Stewart v.
Stewart, 204 Cal. 546, 269 P. 439 (1928); McKay v. Lauriston, 204 Cal. 557, 269
P. 519 (1928); Ferguson v. Rogers, 168 Cal. App. 2d 486, 336 P.2d 234 (1959); Paley
v. Bank of America, 159 CaL App. 2d 500, 324 P.2d 35 (1958); Ottinger v. Ottinger,
141 Cal. App. 2d 220, 296 P.2d 347 (1956); Jacquemart v. Jacquemart, 125 Cal. App.
2d 122, 269 P.2d 951 (1954).
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before the complex constitutional issues are resolved, there is the
practical question of whether there is much need to b concerned
with the constitutional issues. After all, if both spouses are given
management and control of community property, and one spouse uses
or spends the property in a way in which the other spouse does not
approve, the conflict would seem better resolved in the divorce court
than in the United States Supreme Court.
However, the right to manage and control the community prop-
erty means more than just the right to control and direct the hoarding
or expenditure of the community wealth according to the predilections
of the manager. It means, in addition, that the manager and con-
troller has the power to incur debts and thereby make all community
property managed and controlled by that spouse subject to ,the pay-
ment of such debts. 1 The fact that the manager and controller of
that community property technically has an ownership interest in only
one-half of that property is totally irrelevant."2 Thus, the function of
the manager and controller of the community is very similar to that of
a trustee who may incur debts payable from property in which said
trustee has no beneficial ownership.
Conversely, the situation of the spouse without management and
control is similar to that of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust. Al-
though that spouse may have an ownership in trust in one-half of the
community property managed and controlled by the other spouse,
debts incurred by the nonmanaging spouse cannot be collected from
the one-half interest owned by the debtor unless the debt was in-
curred for necessaries,' 3 or until such ownership interest is made
subject to the debtor's management and control or becomes the debt-
or's separate property by agreement between the spouses, by death of
a spouse, or by court order in a legal separation or a dissolution. 4
Implicit in the discussion regarding the right to subject com-
11. Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 684-89, 111 P.2d 641, 643-46
(1941); but see Bare v. Bare, 256 Cal. App. 2d 684, 64 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1967),
wherein the court provided for the apportionment of a husband's support obligations
from a prior marriage between his separate property and the community property which
he managed and controlled.
12. See Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1941).
13. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5116, 5117 (West 1970) for provisions effective until
Jan. 1, 1975.
14. McClain v. Tufts, 83 Cal. App. 2d 140, 142, 187 P.2d 818, 819 (1947).
Even without the transmutation of the community property into separate property of
the wife or the transfer of management and control to her, the creditors of the wife
may still reach that community property by establishing that she was acting as the
agent of the husband. Hulsman v. Ireland, 205 Cal. 345, 270 P. 948 (1928).
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munity property to payment of a spouse's debts is the existence of a
correlative right on the part of the creditors of a spouse to recover
(except when debts for necessaries are involved) only from community
property subject to the management and control of such spouse. Ob-
viously, such creditors can only benefit from the widest possible ex-
tension to both spouses of management and control of the community
property, particularly if involuntary payment of a spouse's debts be-
comes necessary because of the reluctance of either or both spouses
to part voluntarily with community property for the payment of the
debts.
Consequently, whether by design or accident (and the latter
seems a more plausible explanation), the creditors of the spouses,
particularly the creditors of the wife whose powers of management
and control over community property are relatively limited under
present law, will become donee-beneficiaries of the Dymally Bill
when it goes into effect on January 1, 1975. If the movement to-
ward joint and several management and control of the community proper-
ty represents the current forward thrust in the promotion of women's
rights, then it is a strange alliance indeed that brings these conservatively
oriented "creditor-donee-beneficiaries" and feminists together in the van-
guard of the women's liberation movement.
Consistent with the desire that each spouse have all-pervasive
management and control over all community property, regardless of
when acquired, there will necessarily be opposition by creditors to
any constitutional limitation that would require them, before recovering
against any community property, to make careful inquiry not only as
to the source of the acquisition of such property, but also as to the
time of such acquisition. Creditors would clearly prefer to keep intact
the Dymally Bill provisions that accord joint and several manage-
ment and control to both spouses over all the community property,
regardless of the time or source of its acquisition. To the extent that
an application of the constitutional mandate, that no state shall de-
prive a person of property without due process of law, would
thwart such provision for joint management and control of all com-
munity property, we will encounter the rare situation, such as existed
in the case of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation15 of the
creditors opposed to an extension of the due process clause to protect
property rights.
Thus, decisions concerning the application of the Dymally Bill to
15. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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property acquired prior to 1975 will affect the rights of three distinct
persons: the husband, the wife, and the creditor. Whether the creditor
has any standing to be heard in any case involving the constitutional
issues is a separate question; nevertheless, they will unquestionably
be as affected by the decisions in those cases as though they had
been party litigants. Consequently, as the discussion of the various
constitutional issues proceeds, attention will be paid to the rights of
the creditors as well as to the rights of the spouses. Additionally,
some consideration will be given to the practical significance of such
questions to practicing attorneys in their day to day encounters with
what would otherwise seem to be strictly non-constitutional law.
The Dymally Bill and the Deprivation of Property
Without Due Process of Law
Application of the New Law to All Community Property
With respect to the applicability of its provisions, the Dymally
Bill, for many but not for all purposes, makes no distinction between
community property acquired prior to January 1, 1975, and com-
munity property acquired on or after that date.
Thus, Civil Code Section 5125 under the new law provides that
effective January 1, 1975, each spouse has the same management,
control, and power of disposition of all community property (except
the community property business), and each is subject to equal limita-
tions with respect to making gifts thereof or making any disposition
or encumbrance of the community property furniture, furnishings,
and fittings of the home and the wearing apparel of the spouse and
minor children.' Prior to 1975 the wife, under the present Civil
Code Section 5124, has exclusive management and control only over
her community property earnings and her personal injury damages
until commingled with other community property. Otherwise, under
the existing Civil Code Section 5125, the husband has the exclusive
management and control of the balance of the community personal
property, regardless of the source of its acquisition.
Management and control over personal property, as well as the
power of disposition for consideration, are indeed valuable property
rights and incidents of ownership.17 To convert such rights acquired
prior to January 1, 1975, by legislative fiat from exclusive to non-
16. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1974).
17. 2 H. MILLER & M. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 287
(1968).
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exclusive rights and incidents of ownership, would be no less a taking
of valuable property rights than would be an. attempted legislative
conversion by a state of an exclusive license or a patent or other
intellectual product into a non-exclusive license or right.' 8  In both
cases, the conversion clearly diminishes the value of the exclusive
rights and gives the owner thereof something less than he or she had
prior to the conversion. To the extent that such diminution of the
value of the property rights cannot be related to the proper exercise of
state power to promote the health, morals, safety, or welfare of the
people,' 9 the prospect of conflict with the constitutional prohibition
of denial of property without due process of law becomes imminent.20
Unfortunately, the constitutional 'problem cannot be entirely
resolved by amending the Dymally Bill to specify that the new pro-
visions of Civil Code Section 5125 would apply only to community
property acquired after January 1, 1975, since such property would
often be commingled with community property acquired prior to 1975.
Most cases covering commingling deal only with the mixing of com-
munity property with separate property and hold that the whole mass
of commingled property will be rebuttably presumed to be community
property.2' The underlying rationale of the commingling cases is
that the manager of the community, as a type of trustee,22 has acted
wrongly in commingling trust property with his own and should bear
the loss of no longer being able to separate one from the other.23
Possibly the solution, when there is commingling of pre-1975 com-
munity property with post-1975 community property, would be to ap-
ply pre-1975 or post-1975 law to the entire mass in a manner that
would impose the greatest loss of managerial rights on the spouse
responsible for the commingling.
18. In McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843), the Supreme
Court recognized that despite Congress' plenary power over patents, its repeal of prior
patent laws could not impair the right of property held by a patentee under such prior
law. See also People ex rel. Edison Electric Illuminating Co. v. Assessors, 156 N.Y.
417, 51 N.E. 269 (1898).
19. Cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
20. Cf. Addison v. Addison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97,
(1965), the Court allowed certain separate property of the husband to be characterized
as quasi-community property and to be divided upon divorce as if community property
because of the overriding interest of the state in assuring the wife means of sustenance
after the divorce.
21. See, e.g., Falk v. Falk, 48 Cal. App. 2d 762, 120 P.2d 714 (1941); Maskuns
v. Maskuns, 93 Cal. App. 27, 268 P. 1093 (1928).
22. See White v. White, 26 Cal. App. 2d 524, 529, 79 P.2d 759, 762 (1938).
23. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2236 (West 1970); G.G. BOGERT & G.T. BOGERT, TEE
LAw OF TRuSmS AND TRusmEs § 929 (2d ed. 1962).
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While the changes in the powers of management and control
over community real property by the spouses under the new law are
consent of both spouses to sell, convey, encumber or lease for more
than one year any community real property held in both names and
further provides that if a husband sells, conveys, encumbers or leases
for more than one year any community real property standing in his
name alone, then the wife will have one year from the time of the
filing of the instrument for record to set aside the transaction. Under
existing law the husband is not bound by the one year time limitation
for setting aside such sales or the like by -the wife of community real
property held in her name alone, but he is confronted with the rule of
evidence, applicable only to married women under existing Taw, that
when a married woman receives a transfer of property by an instru-
ment in writing, there is a rebuttable presumption that she receives it as
separate property.24  Under the new law, no such presumption is ac-
corded to either spouse, but the husband, as well as the wife, will
have only one year in which to set aside a sale, conveyance, encum-
brance, or lease for more than one year by the other spouse of com-
munity real property standing in that other spouses name alone.
Were this the only diminution of the husband's rights in the community
real property, one would hardly think the due process issue to be
worth raising.
However, the new law also changes Civil Code 5127 to provide
that community real property is under the joint and several manage-
ment and control of both spouses; whereas existing law leaves such
management and control in the husband alone. Such a change is
quite significant despite the restrictions on voluntary transfers or en-
cumbrances by one spouse without the other's written consent, for,
as stated earlier, the power to manage and control is the power to
incur debts and to use property so managed and controlled to pay
such debts. Thus, even though a husband, under existing law, cannot
convey away community real property without the wife's written con-
sent, his creditors may accomplish the involuntary conveyance of that
property by asserting claims against it, regardless of the wife's lack of
consent.25 Therefore a husband has always had the power to do in-
directly with community real property that which he could not do
directly. Under the new law, the wife will have the same power,
thereby infringing upon the husband's heretofore exclusive right to
deal with the community real property by indirect means.
24. CAL. C v. CoDE § 5110 (West 1970), effective until Jan. 1, 1975.
25. Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 111 P.2d 641 (1941).
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Application of the Dynmally Bill to the Debts of the Spouses
The new law purports to make some efforts to distinguish be-
tween debts incurred prior to January 1, 1975, and those incurred on
or after that date in an apparent effort to eliminate possible taking of
property rights without due process. Unfortunately, the attempt made
in the new Civil Code Section 5116 is unsuccessful. Under subsec-
tions (a) and (b) of the new section 5116, the property of the com-
munity, except for the wife's earnings26 (and probably her community
personal injury damages) is not liable for the contracts of the wife
made after the marriage and prior to 1975, unless secured by pledge
or mortgage thereof executed by the husband, whereas under sub-
section (c), the property of the community, without distinction as to
pre- or post-1975 acquisitions, is liable for the contracts of either
spouse which are made after marriage and on or after January 1, 1975.
As a result, if a wife contracts a debt for non-necessaries on January 1,
1975, or thereafter, her creditor can recover against community prop-
erty, acquired prior to 1975, which the husband heretofore thought
was beyond the grasp of her creditors. The loss of such assurance is
indeed the loss of a valuable property right. It could well be argued,
on the basis of existing California case law,27 that the elimination of
the husband's exclusive power of management and control over the
pre-1975 community property is a taking of property without due
process of law.
A comparable due process problem arises with respect to the
community property earnings and personal injury damages of the
26. Effective Jan. 1, 1974, until Jan. 1, 1975, Civil Code § 5116(b) was amended
to provide in part that property of the community would be liable for the contracts
of the wife which are made on or after Jan. 1, 1974, to the extent that her earnings
or separate property have been commingled with the property of the community. This
provision seems to be consistent with the existing law stated in Tinsley v. Bauer, 125
Cal. App. 2d 724, 727, 271 P.2d 116 (1954) as follows: "Although it has been held
with respect to exemption of earnings of the wife for debts of the husband (Civ. Code,
§ 168) that it is waived where such earnings are so commingled with other community
property as to lose their identity . . . the same will not apply to the liability under
Section 167, Civil Code; the wife can waive her exemption but not the liability to her
creditors." This author is aware of the concern by some working on the "trailer bill"
that Tinsley v. Bauer may not eliminate the due process issue as to this provision be-
cause the funds in the Tinsley case were not so totally commingled as to cause all
loss of identity or ability to figure relative contributions to the entire mass. However,
the quoted language seems to remove all doubts as to the principles that were applied
and their applicability to a situation where there is true commingling and a loss of
identity. The danger of a violation of the due process clause by the new CAL. CIv.
CODE § 5116(b) seems remote.
27. See generally Note, Retroactive Application of California Community Prop-
erty Statutes, 18 STAN. L. REV. 514 (1966).
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wife. Prior to 1975, such community property under Civil Code
Section 5117 was not liable for the husband's debts for non-neces-
saries.28 On and after January 1, 1975, under the new Civil Code
Section 5116(c), all community property, including the community
property earnings and personal injury damages of the wife acquired
prior to January 1, 1975, will be liable for the entire debts of either
spouse contracted on or after January 1, 1975. Thus, this elimination
of the wife's exclusive management and control over some of the
community property again raises the due process question.
There; is an additional provision under the new Dymally Bill,
which, although less likely to be a frequent source of litigation, is
nevertheless the basis for another conflict with the due process
clause. Under the new Civil Code Section 199, the obligation of
divorced parents to support their natural children extends to and may
be satisfied only from the earnings and separate property of each.
The implication is that if one of the parents remarries, the community
property earnings of the new spouse of that parent cannot be reached
by the children of the prior marriage for payment of child support,
even though that parent has a one-half ownership right in that prop-
erty as well as joint and several management and control over the
entire amount of such earnings. In a sense, the new code section
represents a departure from the general rule that the debts of a spouse
are payable from any property which he or she manages and con-
trols. Further, it conflicts with and apparently implicitly repeals, by
inconsistency,29 the present Civil Code Section 5127.5, which gives
the wife limited power of management and control over part of her
one-half of the community property (including her husband's earn-
ings) otherwise managed and controlled by her husband so that she
can support her children, even if not of their marriage.30
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5117 (West 1970), effective until Jan. 1, 1975, provides
in part: "The earnings and community property personal injury damages of the wife
are not liable for the debts of the husband; but, except as otherwise provided by law,
such earnings and damages shall be liable for the payment of debts, heretofore or here-
after contracted by the husband or wife for the necessities of life furnished to them
or either of them while living together."
29. But cf. Penziner v. West. American Finance Co., 10 Cal. 2d 160, 74 P.2d
252 (1937).
30. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5127.5 (West Supp. 1974) reads in part: "Notwithstanding
the provisions of Section 5125 or 5127 granting the husband the management and con-
trol of the community property, to the extent necessary to fulfill a duty of a wife to
support her children, the wife is entitled to the management and control of her share
of the community property.
The wife's interest in the community property, including the earnings of her hus-
band, is liable for the support of her children to whom the duty of support is owed,
[Vol. 1
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Such a partial repeal of the wife's power to compel the use of
some of her husband's earnings to support her children takes from her
a valuable right with respect to community property; and since so many
children are being supported by Aid to Dependent Children and other
welfare payments, one could hardly justify this diminution of the
wife's rights in the community property as a taking of property in the
exercise of the state's police power to promote thq health, morals,
safety, and welfare of the people. Certainly, the wife would have
standing to sue in order to contest the constitutional validity of new
Cicil Code Section 199 if it is applied retroactively to take vested
rights in property acquired prior to January 1, 1975. Further, by
reason of retroactively diminishing the rights of the children, as credi-
tors, to recover against such community property acquired prior to
January 1, 1975, the new statute appears to afford a basis for such
child to join in the wife's cause of action to assert the constitutional
issue of denial of their property rights as creditors without due pro-
cess of law. 1
Apart from the rights of such children, as creditors, to have
standing to sue, it does not appear that other creditors of either spouse
will directly have standing to initiate proceedings to test the Dymally
Bill. The remaining provisions of that bill, actually expand
the rights of creditors in general to reach even greater
amounts of the community property formerly managed and controlled
by one spouse to pay the debts of the other spouse. However, once
a spouse does bring suit to contest the retroactive application of the
various provisions of the bill, then creditors may properly become in-
volved in the proceeding, either directly seeking to recover against
all the community property, or as amici curae seeking to protect their
interests in similar subsequent suits.
The Dymally Bill makes a commendable change to Civil Code
Section 5121 by providing that all the separate property of either
spouse may be liable for the payment of debts contracted by either
spouse for necessaries while they are living together and
have no community or quasi-community property to pay for such
necessaries. Under the existing law, which will be effectively repealed
on January 1, 1975, all the separate property of the husband could
be reached by creditors to pay for such necessaries, but only a limited
provided that for the purposes of this section, prior support liability of her husband
plus three hundred dollars ($300) gross monthly income shall first be excluded in de-
termining the wife's interest in community property earnings of her husband."
31. See CAL. CODE CIV. PRO. § 378 (West 1970).
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amount of the separate property of the wife would be subject to the
claims of creditors for debts incurred by a husband for necessaries
while they were living together, even if there were neither
community property nor separate property of the husband to pay
therefor.8" The absurdity of the distinction is only highlighted by
the proviso that is contained in the present Civil Code Section 5121
to define what segments of the wife's separate property are subject to
the claims of the husband's creditors for such necessities. 3
Regrettably, the new Section 5121 of the Dymally Bill will con-
flict with existing California case law34 if, as appears from its word-
ing, it applies to all separate property of the wife acquired prior to 1975
and to all the husband's debts for necessaries, whether incurred be-
fore or on and after January 1, 1975 because the removal of some
of the exemptions of property from the claims of creditors is a taking
of a right or benefit in that property. One can imagine the chaos aris-
ing in a litigated case applying the due process clause to the wife's
pre-1975 separate property commingled with her post-1974 separate
property, particularly because the lack of any trust or fiduciary duties
as to her separate property will preclude application of normal com-
mingling rules against her interests."
The new law does not completely ignore the due process issue,
as shown by the new Civil Code Section 5116(a), which frees the
property of the community from liability for debts of the wife con-
tracted during marriage prior to January 1, 1975. Such observance
of the limitation on retroactivity seems misplaced, however. While
it is true that the restriction, to be consistent with existing decisions
32. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5130 (West 1970) presently reads as follows: "If the hus-
band neglects to make adequate provision for the support of his wife, except in the
case mentioned in Section 5131, any other person may in good faith, supply her with
articles necessary for her support, and recover the reasonable value thereof from the
husband."
33. The present CAL. CIV. CODE § 5121 (West 1970) reads as follows:
"The separate property of the wife is liable for her own debts contracted before
or after her marriage, but is not liable for her husband's debts; provided, that the sep-
arate property of the wife is liable for the payment of debts contracted by the husband
or wife for the necessaries of life furnished to them or either of them while they are
living together; provided, that the provisions of the foregoing proviso shall not apply
to the separate property of the wife held by her at the time of her marriage or ac-
quired by her by devise, succession, or gift, other than by gift from the husband, after
marriage."
34. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton, 1 Cal. 2d 1, 33 P.2d 1 (1934); Credit Bureau
of Santa Monica Bay District Inc. v. Terranova, 15 Cal. App. 3d 854, 93 Cal. Rptr.
538 (1971); Ackley v. Maggi, 86 Cal. App. 631, 261 P. 311 (1927).
35. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra, and cases cited therein.
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on the due process issue,38 should be applied to community property
acquired prior to January 1, 1975, there seems to be no constitutional
prohibition under existing case law against allowing such pre-1975
creditors of the wife to recover against community property acquired
on or after January 1, 1975. 87
Applicability of the Dymally Bill to Presumptions of Separate Property
Also possibly misplaced is the concern shown in the bill that
certain existing rebuttable presumptions relating to community prop-
erty, which will be eliminated for property acquired on or after Jan-
uary 1, 1975, will nevertheless continue to be applicable to property
acquired prior to 1975. As previously stated the new Civil Code
Section 5110 of the Dymally Bill retains the provision that any prop-
erty acquired during marriage and prior to January 1, 1975, by a
married woman by an instrument in writing will be rebuttably pre-
sumed to be her separate property. In accordance with the purposes
and policy of the bill to promote equality between the spouses, no
such rebuttable presumption is applied to property so acquired on or
after January 1, 1975. However, if the rebuttable presumption were
to be repealed even as to property so acquired by the wife prior to
January 1, 1975, there would seem to be no violation of the mandate
of existing California case law holding retroactive operation of com-
munity property legislation on vested property rights to be a denial of
property without due process of law. Such rebuttable presumptions are
merely rules of evidence to aid the court in determining the status of
the property in question.3  Such presumptions neither increase nor
decrease any vested rights in the property in question, for it may be
possible to present sufficient evidence to establish the status of such
property as separate property without resort to the rebuttable pre-
sumption. Early cases in California,39 relying on the due process
clause, denied retroactive application of the enactment creating a re-
buttable presumption of separate status for property received by a
married woman by a instrument in writing. However, the rulings
were prompted by the fear of disturbance of "titles already vested" 40
36. An excellent chart on the case law up to 1965 is found in Note, Retroactive
Application of California's Community Property Statutes, 18 STAN. L. Ruv. 514, 524-
29 (1966).
37. Cf. Ferguson v. Rogers, 168 Cal. App. 2d 486, 336 P.2d 234 (1959).
38. Stafford v. Martinoni, 192 Cal. 724, 738, 221 P. 919, 925 (1923).
39. Booker v. Castillo, 154 Cal. 672, 98 P. 1067 (1908); Nilson v. Sarment, 153
Cal. 524, 96 P. 315 (1908); Jordan v. Fay, 98 Cal. 264, 33 P. 95 (1893).
40. In Jordan v. Fay, 98 Cal. 264, 33 P. 95 (1893), the court indicated that the
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or by the desire to avoid the retroactive application of a presumption
that had become conclusive because a conveyance by the wife to a bona
fide purchaser for value had been made.41
Consistent with those cases, the new Civil Code Section 5110
under the Dymally Bill, recognizing the due process issue, properly
preserves as to pre-1975 property the rule that when the wife deals
with a bona fide purchaser of property which was acquired by the wife
in her name by an instrument in writing, such property is conclusively
presumed to have been her separate property. The consistency of
such a provision with the present rule on retroactivity of amendments
affecting community property is borne out by the rule that a conclusive
presumption is a rule of substantive law,42 and, as with any other sub-
stantive law covering property rights, change of the conclusive pre-
sumption creating a separate property right would affect vested property
rights.
As to property acquired during marriage by an instrument in
writing on or after January 1, 1975, by either spouse in his or her
name alone, the Dymally Bill eliminates in Civil Code Section 5110 all
separate property presumptions. Such a change is consistent with the
purpose of the bill's author to achieve greater equality in the rights of
the husband and the wife.
Another Way to Look at the Due Process Issue
In spite of the present acceptance by the California courts of
the due process rationale of Spreckles v. Spreckes4 3 to prevent
rebuttable presumption in CAL. Civ. CODE § 164 (now § 5110 fWest 1970) ) was a
vested right: "we do not think the legislature' intended or had the power to change
it so that it would be retroactive in effect and disturb titles already vested. To hold
otherwise would probably upset many titles in this state. . . ." Id. at 267-68, 33 P.
at 96. Obviously the court was concerned about titles on the records and the presump-
tions made by the title searchers as to titles acquired in the wife's name prior to the
legislative change in 1891, that such properties were her separate property rather than
community property. To make the law retroactive would require title searchers to
change all presumptions as to any acquisition in the chain of title in the wife's name
that was later conveyed to a grantee -relying on that presumption. Practically speaking,
then, the case of Jordan v. Fay was concerned with protecting subsequent bona fide
purchasers for value.
41. In the later cases of Booker v. Castillo, 154 Cal. 672, 98 P. 1067, (1908),
and Nilson v. Sarment, 153 Cal. 524, 96 P. 315 (1908), the rights of a bona fide
purchaser from the wife were involved; under the law after 1891 the presumption that
such property was her separate property was conclusive when she was dealing with a
bona fide purchaser for value.
42. "Conclusive presumptions are not evidentiary rules so much as they are rules
of substantive law." CAL. EVID. CODE § 620 (Law Revision Comm'n Comment)
(West 1968).
43. 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897).
[Vol. 1
Spring 1974] EQUAL CONTROL OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 111
the retroactive application of legislation affecting any of the bundle of
rights in community property, it appears that without resort to the police
power argument of Addison v. Addison," a basis could be found to limit
the application of the Spreckles case to property acquired prior to 1927.
It has been pointed out that Spreckles, decided prior to 1927,
dealt with California community property in which the wife had
a mere expectancy.4 5 It was only in 1927, when Section 161a
was added to the California Civil Code, that the wife was given
a vested property right in community property in the form of
a "present, equal and existing right."4 If the Spreckles case were
found to be applicable only to property in which the wife had a mere
expectancy, the decision could be harmonized with the United States
Supreme Court decision of Warburton v. White.47 That case held that
a Washington statute, allowing one-half of the community property
to be subject to testamentary disposition by the wife or to descend to
her issue, could be 'applied to property acquired prior to the date of its
enactment in 1879. The rationale of the court was that under the Wash-
ington statute at the time of acquisition, the husband and wife -had
equal proprietary interests in the community property and that such
interests were characterized as a form of partnership property.48 As
to the effect of the statute on the theretofore greater dispositive powers
of the husband, the court pointed out that giving management and
disposition of community property to the husband did not make him
the holder of larger proprietary rights than the wife since someone had
to manage and dispose of the community property during the marriage,
and conferring such power on the husband merely conferred on him a
bare power in trust for the community. It was perfectly competent
for the state legislature to withdraw such a power from him and confer
it upon both spouses without taking away any vested property rights
since each still owned the same proprietary one-half interest in the
property, regardless of who had management and control.4" The
44. 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 897, 43 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1965).
45. Comment, Community and Separate Property: Constitutionality of Legisla-
tion Decreasing Husband's Power of Control over Property Already Acquired, 27
CAIF. L. REv. 49, 55 (1938).
46. Cal. Stats. 1927, ch. 265, § 1 (1927) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 5105
(West 1970) ).
47. 176 U.S. 484 (1900).
48. Id. at 491. In Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311 (1911), Justice Holmes ruled
that New Mexico legislation requiring the written consent of the wife to a conveyance
of community real property could be applied retroactively because the wife, under New
Mexico law, had more than just a mere expectancy or possibility in the community
property. Holmes did not discuss the Spreckles case. However, Justice McKenna, in
a two sentence dissent, cited it without comment.
49. Id. at 490.
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United States Supreme Court acknowledged the Spreckles decision,
but found it inapplioable to the case at hand because it pertained only
to management and control powers during the marriage, rather than
the power of disposition upon death.60 Had the Court been obliged
to review the Spreckles case in light of what it said earlier in its opinion,
the Spreckles decision would probably have been overruled. That the
Court did not do so does not preclude raising the issue now that the
Dymally Bill could be applied retroactively to powers of management
and control over community property acquired after the 1927 enact-
ment of Civil Code Section 161a (now Civil Code Section 5105),
since the bill, under the Warburton rationale, merely affects a "bare
power in trust" for the benefit of the community.
Notwithstanding that the courts today may not apply the trust
power theory of the Warburton case in order to overrule the existing
body of California case law applying the due process clause to prevent
the retroactive operation of statutory amendments affecting separate
and community property of the spouses, there are other approaches
available to support the constitutionality of retroactive application of
the Dymally Bill.
The Equal Protection Clause and the Dymally Bill-
Conflict With the Due Process Clause?
The Husband's Predominant Management and Control of the Community
Property as a Possible Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The argument has been made frequently in recent years that
existing inequalities, sanctioned by long-standing laws, in the manage-
ment and control of community property have never been valid be-
cause they are a denial of equal protection of the laws under the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.," The laws of
several community property states came under severe criticism because
they continued to accord predominant or complete management and
50. Id. at 497. The California Supreme Court, in McKay v. Lauriston, 203 Cal.
557, 269 P. 519 (1928), and Estate of Phillips, 203 Cal. 106, 263 P. 1017 (1928),
held that a statute giving the wife the power to testamentary disposition over one-half
of the community property could not be applied retroactively, but neither case made
any mention of the Warburton case. However, since both cases dealt with community
property acquired prior to 1927, when the wife had a mere expectancy under California
law, no reference to that case was really necessary.
51. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1, provides:
No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of thte laws,
[Vol. I
Spring 1974] EQUAL CONTROL OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 113
control of the community property to the husband,12 and some states
have recently changed their laws as a response to such criticism.5"
However, it has clearly been established by numerous decisions
of the United States Supreme Court that despite the equal protection
clause, state laws under appropriate circumstances may differentiate
between different classes of persons and treat such classes in different
ways.54 A number of tests have arisen to aid the courts in determining
whether a discriminatory classification is constitutional.
Under the "reasonableness" or traditional test, a classifioation
"must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground
of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the
legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike."55 If such a test is used, the party challenging the discriminatory
classification has the burden of proving the lack of reasonableness or
the lack of a substantial relationship between the classification -and the
legitimate interests of the government and community.56 Under the
new and more activist-oriented "suspect classification and fundamental
interest" test, certain "suspect classifications" are subject to a more
careful scrutiny by the courts to determine their justification, even
though they may have some ostensibly rational basis. The most prom-
inent cases involving such active review have been those involving
52. Note, Equal Rights and Equal Protection: Who Has Management and Con-
trol, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 892, 893-96 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Equal Rights];
Bilbe, Constitutionality of Sex-based Differentiations in the Louisiana Community Prop-
erty System, 19 LOYOLA L. REV. (NEw ORLEANs) 373, 390-92 (1973); Note, Com-
munity Property: Male Management and Women's Rights, 1972 LAw AND THE SPECIAL
ORDER 163, 166-71, 173-75 (Arizona).
53. Joint and several management and control of the community was enacted in
1972 in Washington, Arizona, and New Mexico. Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess. 1972, ch.
108, § 3, codified in REv. CODE WASH. ANN. § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1973); Auiz. R V.
STATS. ANN. §§ 25-214 (Supp. 1973); New Mexico Laws 1973, ch. 320, § 10 codified
in N.M. STATS. ANN. § 57-4A-8 (Supp. 1973).
54. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); McDonald v. Board of Election Commis-
sioners, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
55. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
56. Because the test accords considerable deference to alleged reasonable purposes
of the state legislatures, the test is said to embody a deferential or restrained review
by the court of such purposes, particularly in economic regulation cases. The scope
of the court's review in such cases may range from trying to discover the most probable
purpose of the legislation to attempting to discover and attribute to the legislature any
reasonably conceivable purpose that would support the constitutionality of the classifi-
cation. Often the latter approach will be preferred because of the presumption of the
constitutionality of legislation. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAav.
L REV. 1065, 1077-87 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection].
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classifications based upon race.57 In some cases, the motives of the
legislature have been called into question,5 s but for the most part the
courts have followed the mandate of Chief Justice Marshall59 that courts
will not examine the motives of legislators. 60 Other suspect classifications
have included classifications based on national ancestry, alienage, and
wealth.61 Notwithstanding lack of suspicion of a classification, there
has also been recognition that careful review will be given to legislation
that results in unequal treatment with respect to "fundamental in-
terests."6  According to the recent case of San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,6 such interests include only those
rights which are explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion.64 The exact content of such interests or rights is unclear, but
they apparently include rights related to voting, criminal procedure,
and interstate travel, among others.65
57. Id. at 1087-1123.
58. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964), in which
the Supreme Court found that the public schools in Prince Edward County, Virginia,
were closed to ensure that "white and colored children in Prince Edward County would
not, under any circumstances, go to the same schooL"
59. "The case, as made out in the pleadings, is simply this. One individual who
holds lands in the state of Georgia, under a deed covenanting that the title of Georgia
was in the grantor, brings an action of covenant upon this deed, and assigns, as a
breach, that some of the members of the legislature were induced to vote in favour
of the law, which constituted the contract, by being promised an interest in it, and
that therefore the act is a mere nullity.
'This solemn question cannot be brought thus collaterally and incidentally before
the court. It would be indecent, in the extreme, upon a private contract, between two
individuals, to enter into an inquiry respecting the corruption of the sovereign power
of a state. If the title be plainly deduced from a legislative act, which the legislature
might constitutionally pass, if the act be clothed with all the -requisite forms of a law,
a court, sitting as a court of law, cannot sustain a suit brought by one individual
against another founded on the allegation that the act is a nullity, in consequence of
the impure motives which influenced certain members of the legislature which passed
the law." Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 131 (1810).
60. In upholding a Michigan statute severely restricting a woman's right to ac-
quire a bartender's license, the United States Supreme Court, per Justice Frankfurter,
said: "We cannot cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan
legislators nor question their motives. Since the line they have drawn is not without a
basis in reason, we cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real impulse behind the
legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize the call-
ing." Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1948). But cf. Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, note 56, supra.
61. Note, The Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, 82 YALE L.J. 1533,
1534 (1973).
62. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 56, at 1127-31.
63. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
64. Id. at 33-34.
65. Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 56, at 1127.
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Classifications based on sex discrimination have generally been
subjected to the traditional "reasonableness test" with its deferential
treatment of the intent of the legislature when some legitimate purpose
for the classification can be found. The use of such a test is not
without justification. Because many of the laws which discriminate
on the basis of sex have been in existence for many years, they reflect
a solicitude for the welfare and protection of the average woman in a
period of time when she was not as well equipped, either by education
or training, as today's average woman, to exercise rights and assume
responsibilities to the same extent as a man.6 6  Having there-
fore no reason to suspect invidious motives behind such long-standing
sexually discriminatory legislation, the courts have usually been con-
tent to uphold such legislation if there was some reasonable basis for
it, without regard to its operative or secondary effects. Thus, in earlier
cases legislation discriminating between -the sexes in regard to employ-
ment opportunities, hours, or conditions has been upheld by the
United States Supreme Court.6 7  The validity of such legislation cov-
66. In Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-22 (1908), the court said: 'That
woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a
disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when
the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testi-
mony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeat-
ing this from day to day, tends to [have] injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy
mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well being of woman becomes
an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of
the race.
Yet again, history discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon
man. He established his control at the outset by superior physical strength, and this
control in various forms, with diminishing intensity, has continued to the present. As
minors, though not to the same extent, she has been looked upon in the courts as need-
ing especial care that her rights may be preserved. Education was long denied her,
and while now the doors of the school room are opened and her opportunities for ac-
quiring knowledge are great, yet even with that and the consequent increase of capacity
for business affairs it is still true that in the struggle for subsistence she is not an
equal competitor with her brother. Though limitations on personal and contractual
rights may be removed by legislation, there is that in her disposition and habits of
life which will operate against a full assertion of those rights. She will still be where
some legislation to protect her seems necessary to secure a real equality of right.
Doubtless there are individual exceptions, and there are many respects in which she
has any advantage over him; but looking at it from the viewpoint of the effort to main-
tain an independent position in life, she is not upon an equality. Differentiated by
these matters from the other sex, she is properly placed in a class by herself, and legis-
lation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is not
necessary for men and could not be sustained."
67. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (Michigan statute denying a bartend-
er's license to a woman unless she was the wife or daughter of the male owner of
a licensed liquor establishment). Justice Frankfurter's tongue-in-cheek opinion indi-
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ering employment may now be more readily questioned as a result of
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.88 Indeed, some
courts have, to a greater or lesser degree, begun to consider classifi-
cations based on sex as suspect classifications requiring close scrutiny
and a compelling state interest to be upheld as constitutional. 9
However, the United States Supreme Court, in Reed v. Reed,70 ap-
plied the less stringent reasonableness test in striking down as uncon-
stitutional, under the equal protection clause, an Idaho statute providing
that of several persons claiming and equally entitled to administer a de-
cedent's estate, males were to be preferred over females. The court found
the alleged legislative purpose of reducing litigation and intrafamily
controversy over who should be the administrator was an insufficient
justification to overcome the mandate of the equal protection clause.
In a sense, the use of the suspect classification test in Sail'er Inn v. Kir-
by7 can be harmonized with the use of the reasonableness test in
Reed.72  The former concerned sex discrimination in employment, an
activity regulated by a federal statute expressly prohibiting sex dis-
crimination in that activity; whereas the Reed case focused upon an
cated that since bartending by women could, in the allowable legislative judgment, give
rise to moral and social problems, the legislature could devise suitable preventive meas-
ures. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (statute imposing maximum number of
work hours per week permitted for women).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1972), provides: (a) It shall be an unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with -respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment op-
portunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. See also CAL. CONST. art. XX,
§ 18, which provides: "A person may not be disqualified because of sex, from entering
or pursuing a lawful business, vocation, or profession." Despite such a provision
in the state constitution, CAL. LAB R CODE § 1298 (West 1970) makes the
following interesting distinction: "No boy under 10 years of age and no girl under
18 years of age, shall be employed or permitted to work at any time in or in connec-
tion with the street occupation of peddling, bootblacking, the sale or distribution of
newspapers, magazines, periodicals, or circulars or in any other occupation pursued in
any street or public place. Nothing in this section shall apply to cities whose popula-
tion is less than 23,000 according to the preceding Federal census."
69. United States v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v.
Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971); Commonwealth v. Dan-
iel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968).
70. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
71. 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
72. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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economic activity not covered by the Civil Rights Act, but regulated
only under state law.
By comparable reasoning, the constitutionality of statutory pro-
visions for management and control by the husband of community
property should be determined by applying the reasonableness test.
Management and control of community property is an economio acti-
vity not covered by provisions of the federal Civil Rights Act, which
specifies the particular kinds of activities in which there is a funda-
mental interest in prohibiting discrimination based on sex. However,
as more and more legislation at state and federal levels is enacted -as a
reflection of the increasing concern in our society with the issue of
equality between the sexes, the time may come when any legislative
classification based on sex, as with those based on race, will automati-
cally become a suspect classification because a fundamental interest is
involved. The recent case of Frontiero v. Richardson,73 with the close
division of the justices over the use of the suspect classification or the
reasonableness test reflects such a shifting of sentiment.
74
Pending such a transition, arguments will be made that it is rea-
sonable to give principal management and control of the community
property to the husband for one or more of the following reasons: (1)
most husbands are better qualified than most wives to manage property
and financial affairs; therefore, the classification is not a completely
arbitrary one, but has some reasonable basis as an attempt to protect
the wife from her own limitations; (2) placing management and con-
trol primarily in the husband prevents disruption of family harmony
that could arise if a wife could countermand or nullify any decisions
the husband made concerning the community property; (3) confusion
among third persons dealing with disagreeing spouses will be avoided
because they would know that the husband had the final word, thereby
facilitating certainty in commercial transactions. 75 It has been stated
that the above arguments do not provide sufficient justification to meet
even the reasonableness test of the equal protection clause. The class-
ification favoring the husband is either over-inclusive, since some
wives are better qualified to manage financial affairs than their hus-
bands, or is arbitrary, because it selects only the husband to have the
73. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
74. W. DEFuNK & M. VAUGHN, PR cNiPLES Op CoMUdNuiTY PROPRTY 276-
77 (2d ed. 1971).
75. But ef. Comment, The Equal Rights Amendment & Inequality Between
Spouses Under the California Community Property System, 6 LoYoLA L. Rnv. (Los
ANGELES) 66, 93 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Inequality Between Spouses].
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last word in a transaction with community property when either spouse
could reasonably be given such final authority to assure certainty in
dealings with third parties."m
The trend of California and other community property states to
change their statutes to provide a joint and several (or at least more
equal) form of management and control over the community prop-
erty77 may appear to be rendering moot -the question of the validity of
statutes giving the husband the principal management and control of
the community property. However, in California, the retrospective
application of any statute striking down the husband's principal man-
agement and control of the community property presents an interesting
conflict of constitutional provisions.
Retrospective Application of the Dymally Bill: Equal Protection
Clause v. the Due Process Clause
The line of California decisions"8 recognizing the husband's prin-
cipal management and control over the community property as a
vested property right seems to conflict with any retroactive application
of the Dymally Bill to change the management and control of com-
munity property acquired prior to January 1, 1975. However, if a
decision of the California or United States Supreme Court finds that
the existing provision giving the husband principal management and
control violates the equal protection clause, the due process rationale
of the earlier cases may or may not prevail as to community property ac-
quired prior to such decision.
It may be that such a decision based on the equal protection
clause would look to the changed condition of wives in California to-
day from their condition at the time the legislation giving the husband
the principal management and control was first enacted. 79 If the de-
cision rested on such changed circumstances there would be no basis
for retroactive application that would destroy rights vested in the hus-
76. See Bingaman, The Effects of an Equal Rights Amendment on the New Mex-
ico System of Community Property: Problems of Characterization, Management, &
Control, 3 N.M.L. REv. 11, 49 (1973) (e.g., sale of stock) [hereinafter cited as
Bingaman]; Note, Equal Rights, supra note 52.
77. At present, only Louisiana, Nevada, & Idaho (California until Jan. 1, 1975)
preserve principal management & control of the community property in the husband.
IDAHO CODE §§ 32-912 to 32-913 (1973); LA. STAT. ANN. CVIL CODE, art. 2404
(1974); NEv. Rnv. STAT. § 123.230 (1973). But see Riley, Revision of the Property
Law of Marriage-Why Now?, 21 LA. B.J. 29 (1973).
78. Roberts v. Wehmeyer, 191 Cal. 601, 218 P. 22 (1923); Spreckles v. Spreckles,
116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897).
79. Duncan v. Duncan, 6 Cal. App. 404, 92 P. 310 (1907).
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band prior to the date of the transaction overturned by the decision of
the Court, since those prior rights would have had a rational basis
when given. 80
In addition, the Court may very well decide that the violation of
the equal protection clause by giving the husband predominant man-
agement and control did indeed extend to the distant past and even
to a period of time prior to the Spreckles decision. However, it would
be argued, and not without merit, that because so many have relied
on the long line of decisions in California to establish their rights of
management and control over property acquired prior to the effective
date of the Dymally Bill it would produce undue confusion and hard-
ship to compel them to deal differently with property which they
heretofore thought was protected from creditors, or from the real or
imagined profligacy of the wife. Such reasoning opposing retroactive
application of decisions affecting rights under the Constitution has
been adopted in cases dealing with other rights;s but it is hard to
predict whether it would be applied in the case of an equal protection
decision striking down the husband's predominant management and
control.
An approach that might be taken, if such a decision is rendered,
is one representing a compromise: since the wife has had the manage-
ment and control of some of the community property since 1951, that
is, her earnings until commingled, her personal injury damages, and
property traceable to the earnings and damages, legislation giving the
husband comparable control over his earnings or personal injury dam-
ages since 1951 will be found not violative of the equal protection
clause. Only control given to the husband in excess thereof would be
a violation land invalid despite assertions of protection under the due
process clause."? Thus, any community property acquired prior to
1951, and any community property other than the husband's earnings
or personal injury damages acquired after 1951, if previously subject
to the husband's management and control, would now be subject to
the joint and several management of both spouses, since -rational
classification based on responsibility for the acquisition of the property
80. H. VERRALL & A. SAMIS, CALIFoRNrA COMMUNITY PROPERTY--CAsES & MA-
TERIALS 227 (2d ed. 1971).
81. Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384
U.S. 719 (1966). See, e.g., Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971);
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969).
82. See, e.g., TEx, CODE ANN., FAMILY CODE, tit. 1, § 5.22 (Pam, 1973).
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would be impossible.83 To assure further equality, if any of the com-
munity property controlled by a spouse were commingled by that
spouse, then joint and several management and control should apply.84
However, the complications do not end merely with a resolution
of the conflict between the equal protection and the due process
clauses. A whole new body of conflicts within constitutional pro-
visions may arise if a proposed amendment to the United States Con-
stitution is ratified by the requisite number of states.
The Equal Rights Amendment and Its Impact On Management
and Control of Community Property and Vested Rights Therein
The Proposed Equal Rights Amendment
There is currently pending before a number of state legislatures
the following proposed amendment to the United States Constitution:
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of sex."'s5 The amend-
ment has been ratified as of April 1974, by thirty-three states.8 6 Al-
83. Even this approach is opposed by some on the ground that it is merely osten-
sibly neutral and would actually give the wife fewer rights in the marital property than
are given to the husband since men still have greater average earnings than women.
Note, Equal Rights, supra note 52 at 910-11; Bingaman, supra note 76 at 40-43.
84. CAL. Civ. CODE, § 5124 (West 1970), repealed effective Jan. 1, 1975, Cal.
Stat. 1973, ch. 987, provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 5105 and 5125, the wife has the man-
agement and control of the community personal property earned by her, and the com-
munity personal property received by her in satisfaction of a judgment for damages
for personal injuries suffered by her or pursuant to an agreement for the settlement
or compromise of a claim for such damages, until it is commingled with community
property subject to the management and control of the husband, except that the hus-
band may use such community property received as damages or in settlement or com-
promise of a claim for such damages to pay for expenses incurred by reason of the
wife's personal injuries and to reimburse his separate property or the community prop-
erty subject to his management and control for expenses paid by reason of the wife's
personal injuries.
The wife may not make a gift of the community property under her management
and control, or dispose of the same without a valuable consideration, without the writ-
ten consent of the husband. The wife may not make a testamentary disposition of
such community property except as otherwise permitted by law.
85. H.R.J. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as H.R.J. Res. 208]. The other sections of the proposed amendment read as follows:
Sec. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
Sec. 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
It should also be noted that the joint resolution prescribed that the amendment
had to be ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states within seven years
from the date of the submission of the amendment by Congress.
86. Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kan., Ky., Me., Md., Mass.,
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though it appeared that the amendment would fall short of receiving
ratification by the requisite thirty-eight states, the strong endorsment
of the Equal Rights Amendment by the AFL-CIO at its convention in
October, 1973, s1 presages a possible resurgence of efforts to secure the
balance of state ratifications necessary to make the proposed amend-
ment a part of the Constitution. The possibility of its ratification by
the requisite number of state legislatures necessitates some assessment
of the amendment's impact on existing laws concerning management
and control of community property, as well as its possible conflict with
the due process clause.
The broad language of the proposed amendment would appear
to require that men and women be treated identically under the law
in all respects. Such an interpretation is justified by legislative his-
tory which reflects rejection by Congress of committee and subcom-
mittee amendments which would have expressly made the Equal Rights
Amendment inapplicable to laws exempting women from compulsory
military service, reasonably promoting the health and safety of the
people, or making distinctions on the basis of physiological or func-
tional differences between men and women. 8 The omission of such
qualifying or limiting clauses, however, does not mean that no differ-
entiations whatsoever would be permitted between the sexes. The
amendment's proponents have asserted that "equality" does not mean
"sameness", and that there would be no violation of the amendment
by a reasonable classification based on physical characteristics unique
to one sex.89 Rather, the basic principle underlying the Equal Rights
Mich., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.D., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., Ohio, Ore., Pa., R.I., S.C., S.D.
Tenn., Tex., Va., W. Va., Wis., & Wyo. Neb. has attempted to rescind their ratifica-
tion. Only two of the seven community property states have ratified.
87. 84 LAB. REL. REP. 180 (Oct. 29, 1973). The resolution adopted by the con-
vention committed state labor federations to urge their legislatures to ratify the amend-
ment.
88. A summary of the legislative history of the Equal Rights Amendment with
a description of the numerous proposed changes to narrow its broad wording is con-
tained in 118 CONG. REc. S4582-83 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972).
89. The separate views were filed by the proponents of the broad wording with
H.RJ. R P. No. 359, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) that accompanied H.R.J. Res. 208,
supra note 85. They stated in part: "For example, a law providing for payment of
the medical costs for child bearing could only apply to women....
"Just as the principle of equality does not mean that the sexes must be regarded
as identical, so too it does not prohibit the states from requiring a reasonable separa-
tion of persons of different sexes under some circumstances." The report then referred
to such circumstances as regulation of cohabitation and sexual activity by unmarried
persons and the preservation of the right of privacy by separation of the sexes in such
places as public toilets and sleeping quarters. 117 CONG. RFu. 35791, 35792 (1971)
(remarks of Congressman Edwards).
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Amendment is that legal rights must be determined by the actual at-
tributes of an individual, not by a stereotype or overclassifloation
based on sex.90
Although the major emphasis of the proponents is on the elimi-
nation of discrimination against women with respect to such economic
matters as occupational opportunities, compensation for labor, and ed-
ucational opportunities, the Equal Rights Amendment is also expected
to affect state laws governing domestic relations91 and community
property rights. 92
Application of the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the
Management and Control of Community Property
A congressional proponent of the proposed Equal Rights Amend-
ment has made it clear that the amendment would strike down com-
90. Preceding a statement of that principle, Congressman Ryan expressed the be-
lief that although many laws discriminating on the basis of sex had originally been
enacted with the valid intent of protecting the health and safety of women, they often
resulted in unfair discrimination against women. 117 CONG. RFc. 35791 (1971) (re-
marks of Congressman Ryan). Rather than risk the continuation of possible unfair dis-
crimination rationalized by an ostensible motive of protecting the woman, the proponents
instead seek by the amendment to be assured that an individual would be denied
a job or some other right or benefit only because he or she individually lacked.the
requisite physical or mental qualifications to meet the particular requirements for that
job, right or benefit. Thus, if, as recently occurred, a number of female applicants
were denied jobs as police officers because they were unable to carry a 140 pound
weight a certain distance within a certain number of seconds (simulating a police offi-
cer removing a wounded comrade quickly from a field of gunfire), the Equal Rights
Amendment would not be violated even though only male applicants were accepted as
a result.
91. "The Equal Rights Amendment may also have an effect on those State laws
affecting domestic relations in this area, as elsewhere, the amendment will prohibit dis-
crimination based on sex. This will mean that State domestic relations laws will have
to be based on individual circumstances and needs, and not on sexual stereotypes."
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, MAJORITY REPORT ON THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMEND-
MENT, reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. S4586 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1972).
92. Speaking at the consideration H.R.J. Res. 208, supra noic 85. Congressman
Edwards, a proponent of the broad version of the Equal Rights Amendment, stated:
"Some community property states do not vest in the wife the property rights that her
husband enjoys ....
"Under the circumstances, an amendment to our Constitution is not merely appro-
priate, but it is imperative. For it is only by enacting such an amendment that we
can declare a national commitment to the concept of equal justice under the law for
men and women alike." 117 CONG. REc. 35306 (1971) (remarks of Congressman Ed-
wards).
It was also recognized by Senator Ervin, an opponent of the broad language ver-
sion of the Equal Rights Amendment that the community property and common law
systems "contain sex discriminatory aspects which would be changed under the Equal
Rights Amendment," SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, MINORITY REPORT, EQUAL
RIGHTS FOR MEN & WOMEN, S. REP. No. 689, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1972).
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munty property laws giving predominant management and control of
the community property to the husband" rather than equal, or joint
and several management and control to both spouses.
Anticipating that the Equal Rights Amendment would have such
an effect, most of the community property states have already effect-
ively changed their laws to provide either for joint and several manage-
ment and control by both spouses 4 or a form of management and
control that could be described as "separate but equal"; that is, each
spouse has the sole management, control, and disposition of the com-
munity property that he or she would have owned if single. Once
commingled with other community property, the entire mass would be
subject to the joint management, control, and disposition of the
spouses.f5  If there were concern only about the effects of the pro-
spective application of the Equal Rights Amendment requiring changes
in the rules on management and control of community property, the
recent legislative developments in most community property states
would render the issue moot. Even in California, where the joint and
several management and control provisions do not go into effect until
January 1, 1975,96 the issue would be moot since the Equal Rights
Amendment, by its own provisions, does not become effective until
two years after its ratification.97  Furthermore, even if the Equal
Rights Amendment should not be ratified by the requisite number of
states, the case of Frontiero v. Richardson9" foreshadows a possible
expanded application of the equal protection clause to cover such
management and control.99
However, any retroactive application of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment to management and control of community property acquired
93. While debating a proposed limitation on the broad wording of the amendment,
Congresswoman Grasso stated as a reason for her preference for the broad wording:
"And in seven of the eight states where all things acquired during marriage are con-
sidered community property, the husband has the sole right to control and manage the
estate." 117 CONG. REc. 35799 (1971) (remarks of Congresswoman Grasso). Com-
ment, Inequality Between Spouses, supra note 75, at 96; Bingaman, supra note 76, at
18.
94. These states include Arizona, California (effective Jan. 1, 1975), New Mex-
ico, and Washington.
95. TEX. CODE ANN., FAmILY CODE, tit. 1, § 5.22 (1973 Pam.).
96. Cal. Stat. 1973, ch. 987, §§ 20-21.
97. H.RJ. Res. 208, supra note 85.
98. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
99. Chief Justice Berger and Justices Powell and Blackmun indicated that it was
inappropriate at that time to decide whether sex was a suspect classification because
of Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), and because the Equal Rights Amendment has
been submitted for ratification. Id. at 691-92.
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prior to the effective date of that amendment poses another problem.
Whether or not the amendment is preceded in a particular community
property state by a statute establishing equal management and control
of the community property, California cases, relying on the due pro-
cess clause, have established that the husband's management and con-
trol of particular community property may not be taken by retroactively
applying legislation enacted subsequent to the acquisition of the prop-
erty. 00 None of those cases, however, provides guidance as to
whether a subsequent amendment to the United States Constitution
may operate retroactively to take away vested property rights, a
question certain to arise if the Equal Rights Amendment is ratified.
The Equal Rights Amendment v. The Due Process Clause
The proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment did not appear
to give a great deal of consideration to constitutional conflicts that
could -arise from the retroactive operation of that amendment. There
have been some statements made by proponents that the Equal Rights
Amendment would have to be harmonized with the overall structure
of the Constitution;1 1 however, the context of such statements has
indicated a concern only for the protection of certain pre-existing con-
stitutional rights such as an individual's right to privacy.10 2 No par-
ticular solicitude appears to have been shown for the preservation of
pre-existing property rights.
Indeed, there is ample precedent for constitutional amendments
taking without compensation property rights vested under the Con-
stitution. The most obvious example is the Thirteenth Amendment,
which abolished slavery without compensating the slave owners. 0 3
However, the distinction could be made that the Thirteenth Amend-
ment retroactively 'abolished vested property rights in something that
was not properly or morally the subject matter of property in anyone
(that is, property in human beings); whereas the vested right of man-
agement and control of the material things comprising community
property can be the subject matter of property in one or more per-
100. See cases cited note 78 supra.
101. Note, The Equal Rights Amendment & the Military, 82 Y.ALa L.J 1533, 1536
(1973); Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Con-
stitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.i. 871, 912-20 (1971).
102. Hearings on H.R.J. Res. 208 Before Subcomm. 4 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 402 (1971).
103. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911); Peonage Cases, 123 F. 671 (M.D.
Ala. 1903).
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sons without violating such fundamental standards of morality that
retroactive application of the amendment is required.
Similarly, other constitutional amendments have been held to be
effective to take without compensation property rights previously vested
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 4 Likewise, federal regulation of
transactions arising from property rights previously acquired by the
person regulated is not prohibited by the Constitution. So long as
the Constitution authorizes the legislation, the fact that its provisions
limit or interfere with previously acquired property rights does not in-
validate the legislation.10 5
To the extent that the Equal Rights Amendment, if ratified,
purports to destroy previously vested exclusive rights to manage and
control community property, it modifies the requirement of the Fifth
Amendment which states, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." Whether a court, interpreting
the Equal Rights Amendment, should recognize its effectiveness to
take, without compensation, vested property rights previously pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment is a question that may be more jur-
isprudential than practical. More likely, advocates of retroactive ap-
plication of the Equal Rights Amendment will prefer to establish a
justification for retroactivity within the framework of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Such a justification may be found in the argument that a retro-
active application of the Equal Rights Amendment is an exercise of
the police power of the government. Maintenance of the statutory
inequalities of the past for previously acquired property would be
considered so inconsistent with the policy of promoting the general
welfare through equal treatment of the sexes that property rights could
be taken away, if necessary, to assure the desired equal treatment. 0 6
Advocates of retroactive application of the amendment to cover man-
agement and control of the community property have argued that the
existing equal protection clause is not an adequate basis on which to
overrule past legislation because the reasonableness test, rather than
the suspect classification test, still appears to be applied with respect
104. Corneli v. Moore, 267 F. 456 (E.D. Mo.), aft'd, 257 U.S. 491 (1921).
105. Fleming v. Rhodes, 331 U.S. 100, 107 (1947); Legal Tender Cases (Knox
v. Lee), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1870); U.S. CONST., Library of Congress ed.
976 (1963).
106. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552 (1905); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
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to discriminatory classifications based on sex under state law.010
On the other hand, opponents of the retroactive application of the
Equal Rights Amendment would argue that such application would
cause serious economic and social disruptions. They would urge that
the amendment in itself will cause severe strains on family relations
and marriage, 03 and that the retroactive application of the amend-
ment would further aggravate the situation.
A more practical argument against retroactivity could be made
because of its economic consequences. If, prior to January 1, 1975,
the effective date of the Dymally Bill, the husband had management
and control of the community property investments, retroactive oper-
ation of the bill and the Equal Rights Amendment would permit the
wife to intervene at will in future transactions with the investments.
Brokers and other intermediaries who had dealt in the past with the
husband alone would now be uncertain as to the final authority of
either spouse alone to mandate further transactions. Their best solu-
tion would be to demand the more cumbersome procedure of joint
consent to any future transactions with the investments.
Retroactive application of the Equal Rights Amendment to the
husband's predominant management and control of the community
property would not be likely to jeopardize community property trans-
actions completed by him prior to the effective date of the amend-
ment. If the other party to the transaction had relied on existing law
to conclude that the husband's action would be final and binding on
the community, that other party should be treated as a bona fide pur-
chaser against whom the wife would have no greater rights than the
husband would have had. To that extent, completed or recorded trans-
actions in community real or personal property should be free from
rescission or nullification, despite retroactive application of the Equal
Rights Amendment. On the other hand, the management and control
of community property involving inchoate rights or uncompleted trans-
actions may well become complicated by -the Equal Rights Amend-
ment. In particular, there could be severe complications in the pro-
cess of selecting settlement, options or beneficiaries for life insurance
policies or death benefits provided in employee pension plans. It
would be difficult enough to accord to the non-employed spouse the
retroactive right to change beneficiaries and settlement options when
107. Comment, Inequality Between Spouses, supra note 75, at 94; cf. Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
108. See remarks of Congressman Celler, 117 CONG. REc. 35305-06 (1971).
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the life insurance policies and pension plans, though acquired prior
to the effective date of the Equal Rights Amendment, were entirely
community property. The problem would be compounded if inception
of the title to such policies and pension plans had occurred prior to the
marriage, thereby creating a mixture of separate and community prop-
erty in each such policy or plan. Requiring the actuaries of insurers
or pension trusts to compute (based on proportionate ownership
rights and proportionate allocation of interest earned by funds held
under the plan) the portions of benefits that each or both spouses
could control, would create enormous problems of administration."' 9
Absent express provision in the Equal Rights Amendment as to
its retroactive application, the matter will have to be resolved by the
courts. There is ample precedent from prior cases deciding whether
and the extent to which constitutional amendments, 110 legislation,:"
or decisions of the courts, 1 2 should be given retroactive effect, and
the courts will probably again be called upon to establish guidelines
or restrictions on retroactive application.
The Equal Rights Amendment and the Rights of Creditors
Since the Equal Rights Amendment, if ratified, would affect pre-
sent and pre-existing rights of management and control over com-
munity property, there is the need to assess its impact on the rights of
another group-the creditors of the spouses. As has been pointed
out," 3 the power to manage and control community property includes
the power to incur debts and to use all community property so man-
aged and controlled to pay such debts. Should the Equal Rights
Amendment apply retroactively to abolish the husband's exclusive
management and control and substitute joint and several or equal
management and control of community property, regardless of when
acquired, the creditors of either spouse could invoke the amendment
to reach any and all of that community property. In this context, the
109. The complexity of calculating the interests of the community and separate
property is indicated in Gettman v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power, 87
Cal. App. 2d 862, 197 P.2d 817 (1948). Normally, however, selection of the mode
of payment of the pension benefits is governed by the terms of the contract with the
employer covering both the method of selection and the person who may select. See
Ball v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 30 Cal. App. 3d 624, 106 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1973);
cf. Phillipson v. Board of Administration, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr.
61 (1970).
110. See cases cited notes 103-05 supra.
111. See cases cited note 10 supra.
112. See cases cited note 81 supra.
113. See cases cited note 11 supra.
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Equal Rights Amendment accords even greater advantages to the
creditors of the spouses than does the California law going into ef-
fect on January 1, 1975. The new California law at least recognizes
due process restrictions by providing, inter alia, that non-necessity
debts incurred during marriage by the wife prior to January 1, 1975,
would be payable only from her community property earnings,114 and
that the earnings and community property personal injury damages
of the wife would not be liable for the non-necessity debts of the
husband incurred during marriage prior to January 1, 1975.111 The
Equal Rights Amendment, if applied to all of the community property,
gives each spouse the power to mandate the use of any or all of the
community property, regardless of who earned it or of when it was
acquired to pay the debts of that spouse.
The more difficult issue under the Equal Rights Amendment,
however, will be whether the rights of the creditors would be correla-
tive with the expanded and retroactively applied powers of either
spouse to use any community property to pay his or her debts incurred
during marriage.
An example will serve to illustrate the problem. Suppose that
prior to the effective dates of the Dymally Bill and the Equal Rights
Amendment the wife had incurred debts during the marriage in the
amount of $5,000. If $5,000 worth of community property traceable
to the husband's community earnings acquired prior to the effective
dates of the Dymally Bill and the Equal Rights Amendment can be
found, may the creditors reach that property without joining the wife
as a co-plaintiff in a separate action to wrest that property from the
grasp of a husband holding onto the last vestiges of male dominance
114. Cal. Stat. 1973, ch. 999, §§ 2, 3, at 1826, effective Jan. 1, 1975 and amend-
ing, CAL. CIV. CODE § 5116 (West 1970) provides:
(a) The property of the community is not liable for the contracts of the wife,
made after marriage and prior to January 1, 1975, unless secured by pledge or mort-
gage thereof executed by the husband.
(b) Except as otherwise provided by law, the earning of the wife are liable for
her contracts heretofore or hereafter made before or after marriage and prior to Janu-
ary 1, 1975.
115. Cal. Stats. 1973, ch. 987 at 1861, amend. CAL. CIv. CODE § 5117, effective
January 1, 1975, to read:
The earnings and community property personal injury damages of the wife are not
liable for the debts of the husband incurred prior to January 1, 1975; but except as
otherwise provided by law, such earnings and damages shall be liable for the payment
of debts, heretofore or hereafter contracted by the husband or uife prior to January
1, 1975, for the necessities of life furnished to them or either of them while they are
living together. As used in this section, "community property personal injury damages"
has the meaning given that term by subdivision (b) of Setcion 4800.
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in the marriage? Suppose the wife now has second thoughts about
that debt and decides that she would prefer the continuing benevolent
despotism of her husband as to the $5,000 worth of community prop-
erty over the newly enlightened self-interest of a cerditor invoking
the highest ideals of the Equal Rights Amendment to put a decisive
end to the husband's exclusive management and control of that prop-
erty. Then what would be the rights of the creditors? May the wife
sacrifice her hard-won rights to manage and control the $5,000 pre-
viously in her husband's exclusive province by now disclaiming her
right to share management and control thereof? Does she have a
right to disclaim management and control of community property
earned by the husband after the effective date of the Equal Rights
Amendment for the purpose of thwarting the creditor's designs of ob-
taining payment of the debt?
It would seem that the management and control of anything the
husband earned as community property after the effective date of the
Equal Rights Amendment could not properly be disclaimed by the
wife to defeat the claims of creditors. The resemblances to a trans-
action in fraud of creditors would be undeniable.11 However, were
the wife only to reject the management and control bestowed upon her
by the Equal Rights Amendment over community property acquired
prior to the effective date of the amendment, her action would not be
unlike the act of a beneficiary disclaiming a testamentary gift for the
equally lofty purposes of defeating a claim of the beneficiary's creditor
or of reducing the amount of taxes that would otherwise be paid.
The analogy of disclaimer seems appropriate since the efficacy of the
disclaimer to defeat the rights of a beneficiary's creditor, or the gov-
ernment's pursuit of revenue, depends principally on whether the in-
terest in the property had vested in the beneficiary at the time of the
disclaimer.117  Thus, it could reasonably be argued that the wife's
creditor could not recover against community property acquired prior
to the effective date of the Equal Rights Amendment if she disclaimed
her right to the management and control thereof within a reasonable
116. Cf. Estate of Kalt, 16 Cal. 2d 807, 108 P.2d 401 (1940) (disclaimer by bene-
ficiary of interest under will of decedent to defeat claims of beneficiary's creditors held
not effective). But cf. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 190-190.10 (West Supp. 1974).
117. For Federal Gift Tax purposes, for example, a disclaimer of an interest under
a will by a beneficiary is deemed to not be a gift by such beneficiary if under state
law, such interest is deemed not yet vested in the beneficiary at the moment of de-
cedent's death, or if the beneficiary may completely and unqualifiedly refuse to accept
the property from the estate. In such case, the disclaimer would not be deemed a gift
subject to tax, Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (as amended by T.D. 7296, 12-11-73).
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time after such date. In effect she would have a form of election not
unlike the widow's election.
Conclusion
The constitutional law problems involving the present law cover-
ing the management and control of community property in California
are already many and complex. The addition of the changes under
the Dymally Bill on January 1, 1975, will serve only to add further
constitutional law issues to be resolved by the courts; and, if the due
process strictures of existing California case law are applied to preclude
retroactive operation of the Dymally Bill provisions, the date of Jan-
uary 1, 1975, will be added to all the other dates that must be learned
to ascertain what rights each spouse (and/or his or her creditors) has
as to each item comprising the mass of community property possessed
by spouses after a marriage of long duration.
Even the Equal Rights Amendment, if ratified by the requisite
number of states, will not serve to resolve all of the constitutional
law questions on the management and control of all past, present, and
future community property. Litigation would still be necessary to de-
termine what, if any, retroactive application the amendment would
have on the management and control of community property acquired
prior to its effective date. Even more difficult, since not considered
in the legislative history, is the assessment of the impact of the amend-
ment on the rights of the spouses' creditors, particularly if a wife would
be loath to have the newly won liberation of the community property
redound to the ultimate benefit of her creditor as the sole and final
controller of the community property. The simplest solution to the
constitutional law problems on management and control of the com-
munity property may lie in the resurrection of the fiduciary theory
expounded in the old and apparently still valid Warbzirton'1 8 case de-
cided by the United States Supreme Court. If that theory is accepted
to reduce the right of management and control to a mere fiduciary
power of a trustee rather than the beneficial right of a cestui que
trust, then retroactivity and consequent taking of property without due
process cease to be problems. A new trustee or co-trustee may deal
as fully and completely with trust property (regardless of when ac-
quired) for the benefit of all beneficiaries, as could a former trustee
or a present co-trustee. Since the fiduciary theory is based on the
United States Supreme Court decision, it would take precedence over
118. Warburton v. White, 176 U.S. 484 (1900).
[Vol. I
Spring 1974J EQUAL CONTROL OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 131
any California cases denying retroactive application on the grounds
that such application would take away vested rights established by
prior erroneous interpretation of management and control as a benefi-
cial interest rather than as a fiduciary power. Retroactivity would be
denied only to avoid hardship to those who have relied on previous
California case law or in order to effect a smoother transition between
operation under the old law and operation under the new law and/or
the Equal Rights Amendment establishing joint and several manage-
ment and control of community property in California.

